ABSTRACT This introductory article discusses some of the main themes that are contained within this collection originally delivered as papers to two conferences. There is brief consideration of some issues of method and major themes relating to the legacy of authoritarian regimes, the process of change and the current state of 'democracy' are identified. Continuing controversies and uncertainties around intelligence have important implications for democratic governance in many countries which must encourage more comparative work in this key area of intelligence studies.
Introduction
This collection of articles originated as papers delivered to two conference panels in February and March 2011. The first was under the auspices of the International Political Science Association and European Consortium of Political Research in Sã o Paulo, Brazil, and the second as part of the Intelligence Studies section at the International Studies Association in Montreal, Canada. The organization of the two panels was somewhat different in that the specific intent at Sã o Paulo was to present papers that were themselves comparative as between a number of national intelligence structures while the Montreal panel presented a number of more detailed country studies. However, it was agreed that the richness of the papers merited joint publication and hence this Special Issue. The object of this introductory essay is to pick out some of the main themes that are contained within the papers with the ambition of encouraging more comparative work in this key area of intelligence studies.
The single-country studies here (Joanisval Gonc alves, Helge Lurå s and Cris Matei) add to or, in some cases, update the published work on intelligence democratization in, for example, Bruneau and Boraz and Farson et al. 2 There are a number of articles that have in recent years sought to further the cause of comparative study of intelligence 3 and the papers here by Marina Caparini, Marco Cepik and Chris Ambros, and Eduardo Estévez might be seen as some implicit response to the argument that scholars need now to add comparative analysis to the increasingly rich array of single-country studies of democratization. As a basis, of course, we do have an extensive comparative politics literature on democratization but key questions remain as to how this might be applied to the distinctive field of intelligence as a government activity. What is clear from the pre-existing literature and the articles here is that intelligence is, in some sense, the last frontier for attempts to democratize previously authoritarian governmental structures and processes.
Some Definitions and Questions of Method
The countries discussed here represent a rich variety in terms of democratic experience. India has been described as the 'largest democracy in the world' since it achieved independence from Britain in 1947 and South Africa shifted rapidly from an authoritarian, racist state to being formally democratic in the early 1990s. Of the Latin American countries, only one, Colombia, has met democratic criteria in terms of regular, competitive elections for most of the last 60 years though the extensive violence it has suffered must question the adequacy of such formal definitions. The other cases are European and share some common experience in having communist governments until the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact during 1989-91. The articles concentrate on the issue of civilian internal security intelligence; in Latin America, of course, a key element in democratization was removing military agencies from internal security and policing and confining them to defence issues but, with one or two exceptions, we do not deal with the issue of military intelligence per se.
For us as editors -one US, one Brit -a final recommendation for the collection is that it discusses intelligence in countries outside the AngloAmerican sphere which so dominates intelligence studies to date: in the collections by Praeger (Strategic Intelligence, 2007, 5 volumes), Routledge (Handbook of Intelligence Studies, 2009) and Oxford University Press (Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, 2010) of the 134 authors, 70 per cent were US and 15 per cent UK. A quick survey of the contents of 124 articles suggests 64 per cent concerned only the US. Such myopia can be dangerous as well as parochial, since all of the world's current hottest conflict zones speak languages far removed from English. 4 Most though not all countries discussed here have recent experience of authoritarian governments but what is it that they aspire to become? In authoritarian regimes the primary if not sole objective of security and intelligence agencies is the preservation of the regime and suppression of opposition. As such, agencies may be controlled by the ruling party, be part of a military command structure or function as an autonomous 'state within a state' but what they all enjoy is the absence of any independent oversight. In democracy the functions of security intelligence are defined in line with a more inclusive definition of national security threats; although monitoring 'enemies of the state' remains, it should be the case that they pose a genuine threat to public security rather than simply political opposition. Further, democracy requires that security and intelligence activities are subject to control and oversight in the interests of effectiveness, efficiency, legality, propriety and respect for rights. At least, that is the goal but we must examine to what extent intelligence governance actually achieves real change rather than merely providing a cloak of legitimacy that hides the continuation of older intelligence activities.
The ability of intelligence agencies to subvert formal oversight mechanisms can hardly be overstated. The veil of secrecy combined with the lack of expertise common to political overseers, and the press of other work to which they must attend, enables all kinds of deceptions. In the USA the requirement that all involved sign non-disclosure agreements neuters most effective exposure should wrongdoing be detected. A US Congressman told one of us bluntly that the House and Senate oversight committees were intended and designed to 'overlook' more than to oversee. And the sitting Chair of the Senate intelligence committee once confided privately that one must be 'very careful because when these guys get mad, there are real consequences'. 5 This comment was in a context of exposing an illegal domestic intelligence operation, something that occurs far more frequently than most suppose. Many American politicians have found that covert skills at manipulating elections abroad are transferrable to troublesome congressmen at home. Even where information is provided, overseers must inspect it closely, for example, although the Congress has sought to ensure that it receives advance notice of intended CIA covert actions, this has not prevented major rows. The CIA briefed senior congressional members in 2002 about the use of 'enhanced interrogation' techniques but once the controversy about torture erupted years later, the precise nature of these briefings was hotly disputed. 6 The publication of 'leaked' internal National Security Agency (NSA) documents since June 2013 has detailed governments' attempts to achieve total surveillance of the Internet and other communications. 7 We cannot consider here the many issues raised but they include elements of all the 'usual suspects' accounting for inadequate democratic control of intelligence: outdated or otherwise inadequate legal frameworks, insufficiently informed or curious overseers and a propensity for agencies to be 'economical with the truth', if not actually providing misleading information. If these problems persist in the well-resourced US oversight structure, the potential for the relatively impoverished structures of all other countries to be misled by the agencies is even greater.
Questions of method are considered explicitly in some of these articles and implicitly in others. Caparini argues that both detailed case studies and comparison are required in order to generate general findings that might inform reform efforts. Most of the studies here rely on traditional historical and institutionalist approaches that have dominated the study of intelligence democratization to date. This is hardly surprising since, as noted by Bruneau and Boraz, 8 intelligence centres on state power and democratization (as well as de-democratization) are clearly historical processes. Cepik and Ambros and Estévez make use of concepts developed in evolutionary biology and political science to frame their analyses in terms of the debate between 'path dependency' and 'punctuated equilibrium' and focus on the specific impact of crises in order to understand how systems adapt, or not. Where comparison is conducted the question of case selection arises and two approaches are manifest here: Caparini and Estévez look at 'sub-regions' where there are important historical and cultural similarities in order to explicate further similarities or significant differences. Cepik and Ambros choose their countries on the basis that they are at roughly equal levels of economic and social development. Comparisons may also be made between time periods; here, for example, Matei examines the differences in Romania between pre-and post-EU/NATO accession.
We do not want to conduct a lengthy analysis of comparative method here but draw on some of the major literature in the field to provide a framework for this discussion.
9 Without suggesting some required sequence for democracy to come about, it seems to us useful to distinguish three periods: the legacy, the change and where the country is now. 7 The documents and associated discussion can be viewed at ,http://www.theguardian. 
The Legacy
Most of the literature to date has concentrated on authoritarianism as the legacy for democratizing countries. This has had two main manifestations: in Europe, Soviet-style communism or 'state socialism'; and in Latin America, military dictatorships. Of course, these broad classifications concealed differences that are examined in the articles below, for example, the security and intelligence services of the Warsaw Pact were not just modelled on the Soviet KGB but were actually subservient to it in what amounted to a denial of national sovereignty. Other East European states, notably, Romania (see Matei) and Yugoslavia (see Caparini, Lurå s) retained greater national independence even if their security services could be just as unpleasant. There were also differences between Latin American military regimes: Estévez distinguishes the relatively 'progressive' militaries of Peru and Ecuador from the 'neo-liberal' Argentina. However, what these countries shared was an effective merging of internal and external security in a single doctrine of regime protection by means of widespread surveillance of society and the repression of dissent by 'political police'. However, authoritarianism was not the only legacy -in some countries there will have been a previous period of colonial rule or even a short period of democracy. These earlier legacies may be very significant; for example, as shown by Caparini and Lurå s, it is impossible to understand developments in the Western Balkans without taking into account the historical relationships of its several national and ethnic groups prior to the period of Communist rule instituted at the end of the Second World War. Thus, as Estévez notes, there is no starting afresh for countries.
The Change
The term 'transition' is used by several authors; indeed, Caparini refers to the 'triple transition' in Eastern Europe of securing national autonomy, democratization and marketization. However, we have avoided the use of the term here because it can imply a particular, pre-ordained destination of democratic intelligence architecture. Rather, we prefer to retain the idea that democratization is a process rather than an event and that, as such, it may stop or go into reverse.
10 However defined, change may well take a 'long and winding road' in a field of state activity where pervasive secrecy facilitates resistance to what officials may perceive as threats to their organizations and budgets. In these articles we see a variety of approaches to analysing the change that takes place (or seeking to explain why it does not.) For example, periods of relative stability characterize security and intelligence systems (as with government more generally) but periods of rapid change may be experienced at certain critical 'junctures' (Estévez) or 'moments' (Cepik and Ambros). Gonc alves and Lurå s both identify quite long periods after the formal demise of the ancien regime when change seems to simmer slowly through a series of false starts or apparent stasis. The key question raised is therefore the extent to which periodic crises produce real change or whether agencies successfully resist, perhaps with some minimal adaptation. It is not always easy, especially at the time, to assess correctly just how significant change is -Estévez suggests that critical junctures are those at which some pre-existing possibilities are closed off; if this is the case with democratic changes then it implies that de-democratization itself is closed off and that the editors' more general argument does not stand. We are content for now to leave this issue up for debate and empirical analysis.
Generally in the social sciences it is customary to examine change through the prisms of agency and structure. Using the former term when discussing intelligence can be confusing since we are concerned with intelligence 'agencies' so we use the term 'actors' to describe those who can be significant in an area of state policy that, under authoritarian regimes, is so clearly linked to the fate of specific rulers. Caparini notes that ministers in fledgling democracies continued to view agencies as a key instrument for the surveillance of opposition politicians in the context of competitive elections that were a new experience for all concerned. Of course, 'actors' may be institutions as well as individuals and, from a different perspective, Estévez compares the respective roles of executives and legislatures in stimulating a shift towards democracy in Latin America. But even if actors make their strategic and tactical choices, as a well-known nineteenth-century German philosopher observed, they do not do so in circumstances of their own choosing. There are structures of culture, rules and institutions providing the context within which choices as to what is desirable and/or feasible are made. The most distinctive context for intelligence governance is the ubiquity of secrecy. This constrains debate in many ways; insiders can manipulate it to reduce the numbers of people involved in debates and to set the parameters of what is possible. Consequently, as Cepik and Ambros note, the closed nature of intelligence systems can minimize the impact even of scandals. Some degree of secrecy is necessary for effective intelligence but, bearing in mind Lord Acton's observation that 'Everything secret degenerates, even the administration of justice; nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and publicity', 11 the problem is how to square the secrecy circle. The challenge is to install structures of control and oversight that minimize the potential for intelligence to degenerate.
A complementary path to control of intelligence excess or corruption is development of a professional ethos among practitioners. 12 In medicine and law this process took about a century. So patience is recommended, and results in those fields are far more visible to polite society. Many attempts to create codes of ethics for spies have faced stiff opposition from powerful individuals and from bureaucracies that actually fear ethical constraints on their sacred 'methods'. The codes that are publicly visible are shockingly rudimentary, as if written by children instead of mature, moral adults. The excuse of 'worst case scenarios' and 'national security emergencies' is ever handy to apologists of torture, murder and corruption of other people's governments. But ethics is at root the fundamental difference between intelligence that protects people and core values like freedom, and malignant political police who parasitize their peoples in service to evil employers. So with patience, much work remains to be done on social controls like oversight mechanisms that actually work, and on internal controls that help practitioners become servants of social ideals even when faced with horrific exigencies and hostile bureaucracies.
One specific aspect of structure that provides an interesting contrast in these articles is the international context within which national intelligence architectures develop. Potential entry to NATO and the EU has provided a distinctive set of sticks and carrots for former communist countries in central and south-eastern Europe, though once accession is achieved the pressure for greater democratic transparency reduces. For example, Matei notes how the reform emphasis shifted after EU accession was achieved in Romania and Caparini discusses the somewhat ambiguous impact of these international pressures. There are no real Latin American equivalents to these multi-and supra-national organizations in relation to democratization but there has been a clear change in the position of the regional hegemon. For the duration of the Cold War, the United States' main priority was that governments in its Central and South American 'backyard' be anti-communist and this was a significant factor in the installation and/or maintenance of military regimes. During the last 20 years, however, the US has found it easier to embrace democratizing tendencies in the region, even if these have been rather narrowly defined in terms of free market liberalism and Gonc alves notes the relevance of North American models of intelligence and its governance to developments in Brazil.
Where are Regimes Now?
Before we get down to considering where states are, there is an earlier question that needs to be asked in comparative analysis: is there a 'state'? Our cursory review of the intelligence studies literature demonstrated the dominance of studies of modern, affluent, bureaucratic, Westphalian states, primarily in the Anglo-American world. This is understandable and has been highly productive in generating more general ideas of how intelligence and its governance 'works' or, ideally, 'should work'. But we must beware that these ideas cannot be simply transplanted worldwide and more recent and current developments suggest strongly that we may be reaching the limits of what can be learned from ever more detailed studies of state intelligence architectures. There are clearly-recognizable states in all but one of the countries included in this collection, but we must note the implications of debates about ethnicity or nationality, sometimes connected with border issues. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as shown by Lurå s, and Kosovo, these amount to serious contestation of the 'state'.
Where there is a state, the democratization literature encourages us to ask whether reforms have been 'consolidated' such that democracy is 'the only game in town', 13 whether change has ground to a halt in a condition of 'feckless pluralism' 14 or 'pseudodemocracy' 15 or may actually have regressed such as is generally recognized to have occurred in Russia since 2000. 16 We have already made clear our preference for viewing democratization as a process which might be reversed and so any evaluations of individual countries on this score may only be temporary but there are other important questions to be examined. For example, Estévez makes the important point that the restoration of democracy is, by itself, not a sufficient condition to trigger intelligence reform; this reminds us that intelligence is a distinctive state activity. Given secrecy and the proximity of intelligence to governments anxious to reassure publics that they can provide security in turbulent times, security and intelligence officials are well-placed to remain as an 'authoritarian enclave'. 17 This will be more likely the longer public fear and suspicion of intelligence persists and, if elected politicians are reluctant to risk being 'tainted' by association with intelligence, then, as Lurå s notes in Bosnia, it may be easier for professionals to control reform and maintain the autonomy of agencies. This is not healthy, especially when we remember, as Cepik and Ambros observe, that the tension between security and democracy guarantees the inevitability of periodic crises.
Another factor to be taken into account is the capacity of the state, depending on a range of factors including its fiscal base, levels of education and training and so on. In parallel with the ambiguous contribution of international bodies noted in the previous section, the impact of richer Western nations on intelligence democratization in poorer European countries has been significant, though driven as much by the desire to make operational alliances as to encourage democratization per se. So we need to ask the question whether changes in intelligence governance have been successful in increasing the sovereign autonomy of new democracies or, rather, based on offers of training, equipment and other resources in return for local support, have cemented their somewhat liberalized structures into a broad Western-led intelligence coalition. This would be dangerous if the focus of local intelligence were directed more towards the priority targets of donors than a careful evaluation of local security threats. The US and UK have premised much of their assistance of the last decade on their perception of a global jihadist threat which, if it exists at all in many countries, is insignificant by comparison with, say, threats from corruption and organized trafficking. For example, the four countries compared by Cepik and Ambros are all democracies and all suffer from extensive criminal and political violence, but only in India does some part of this derive from jihadism.
Other current developments reinforce the recognition that 'democracy' and 'intelligence' do not sit comfortably together, for example, the growing significance of the corporate security and intelligence sectors and their relationships with state agencies.
18 These constitute networks of security provision and raise profound questions about the quality of intelligence governance because they are largely beyond the reach of democratic governments. Cash-strapped governments and/or those imbued with enthusiasm for privatization may well find it convenient, if not actually necessary, to implement their security goals through private corporations, and democratic control of such 'corporatist' arrangements is hardly on the agenda.
19

Conclusion
These articles have great relevance as we contemplate the significance of current events for intelligence governance. Cepik and Ambros note that crises and scandals, which are endemic within intelligence, may be benign and creative in enabling systems to react to overdue changes. Whether they do so in a productive manner depends on the lessons learned, if any. Caparini notes that policymakers, reformists and practitioners can all learn from the study of change in intelligence organizations while Estévez reminds us that some problems persist in ways suggesting that lessons often are not learned or, once learned, are then forgotten. For example, do lustration and vetting for new agencies achieve the goal of more professional intelligence agencies and, if not, why not? If unreconstructed ideologues and human rights abusers are kept out of the new agencies, where do they go? Do they have adequate pensions or are they left to their own devices to make a living by hiring out their skills and old contacts to new corporate employers or, even worse, criminal organizations? Finally, how effective are the new control and oversight institutions of democracy in, if not preventing crises then, at least ameliorating them and turning them to productive use in terms of increasing the effectiveness and propriety of intelligence? As can be seen in a number of contributions here, the danger is that the formal establishment of oversight can give a false sense of security and permit continuing inefficiencies and corruption to exist for a long time until, almost certainly, a major legitimacy crisis erupts.
Differences between healthy democracies and police-states may be the most significant distinctions in political theory. As so many authors have noted, there are intrinsic and serious contradictions between ideal democracy and security institutions that rely on secrecy for their power. Power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely, and everything secret degenerates; these principles have been shown to be true repeatedly in human history. Therefore the process of democratization from police-state antecedents which our authors explore is of great importance to democracies that wish to endure. The difficult tasks of promoting ethical identity among intelligence practitioners and effective oversight by institutions removed from the corruptive processes that afflict central governments are critical if democracy is to survive the corrosive effects of intelligence agencies turning on the peoples who create and empower them.
It must be abundantly clear that, as this is written, these are very far from purely academic questions. There are continuing intelligence controversies with important implications for democratic governance in many Latin American countries and, perhaps even more so, in the new democracies of south-east Europe that struggle to sustain themselves in the face of continuing nationalist questions and war-ravaged political economies that bred corrupt networks of government, crime and business. Beyond the scope of this collection: the Arab Awakening in the Middle East has seen the overthrow of dictators in Tunisia and Libya but there is ongoing repression in Bahrain, Egypt, Syria and Yemen and general uncertainty as to the longer-term outcomes. Even where dictators have left the stage, the extent to which security, intelligence and military organizations remain embedded in those societies present a profound challenge to those who would bring about democratic change. Clearly, it cannot be assumed that these nations will simply adopt some liberal-democratic model for the control and oversight of state intelligence agencies, especially where significant decentralization results in networks of multiple security actors in corporate and civil society sectors. 20 We hope that this collection will provide a basis and inspiration for further comparative analysis of this crucial topic.
